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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant Brad Alan Chapman ("Appellant") files this appeal from a decision of
the First District Court of Box Elder County granting a divorce to Desire N. Chapman
("Appellee") granting alimony and attorney's fees to the Appellee. This Court has
jurisdiction over "Appellant's appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp.
1996) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE I:

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
ALIMONY TO THE APPELLEE WITHOUT FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANT HAD THE ABILITY TO PAY ALIMONY AS ORDERED?

ISSUE II:

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY FEES TO THE APPELLEE WITHOUT FINDING THAT
THE APPELLANT HAD THE ABILITY TO PAY SAID ATTORNEY
FEES?

ISSUE III:

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY FEES TO THE APPELLEE WITHOUT FINDING THAT
THE FEES WERE REASONABLE?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

A TRIAL COURT HAS BROAD DISCRETION IN

DETERMINING ALIMONY AND THE DETERMINATION OF AN
ALIMONY AWARD IS REVIEWED FOR A CLEAR AND
PREJUDICIAL ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

H.

A TRIAL COURT HAS BROAD DISCRETION IN AWARDING

ATTORNEY'S FEES IN A DIVORCE MATTER AND THE
DETERMINATION OF AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS ALSO
REVIEWED FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

AUTHORITY:

Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877. 879 fUtah App. 1995)
Childs v. Childs. 967 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1999)
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg. 875 P.2d 598 (Utah 1994
Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1994)
Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209. 1211 (Utah App. 1991)
Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 480 (Utah App. 1991)
Porco v. Porco. 752 P.2d 365. 368 (Utah App. 1988)
Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988)
Kerr v. Kerr. 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980)
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iM'ri'^K^iiiN.vrivrpuoMSioi n i
There are no constitutional provisions that are determinative in this anr^n1 - *ih f

-c

Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a) (1995) codifies four factors trial courts must consider in determining
alimony. Utah Code Ann. § 3u

i ;v:>) codifies the court's discretionary authority to

award attend \ ».
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
••v;—-.. • !

ir

— —

•

ne

decree V.-J

Divorce awarded Mrs. Chapman monthly ch ild support in the amount of $ 77() Of)
Said Decree further awarded Mrs,, Chapman monthly alimony in t . ..
500 i

.

..w*v;ovci, /-., i >™nian was ordered to pay Mrs. Chapman's attorney's

fees in <
$14,550.00.

( nuiso nf the hoeeedmgs:
This matter was scheduled for 'trial on January" 12, 1999, but was continued due to
Mrs. Chapman's failure to respond to Mr. Chapman's discovery requests. This
matter finally came lo lnal on l«ebiuary IL.1 I"111"1 |l I km lo the leiiglJi of Mis.
Chapman's case, Mr. Chapman was not nhlv to prodncv his witness or inlv lln1
stand himself that day. The matter was scheduled to resume at 1:30 p.m. on
February A 1999.
1

After the trial on February 12, 1999, Judge Judkins, in chambers, stated his
interest in a particular monetary argument Mr. Chapman was presenting.
However, he stated that the matter of custody was clearly resolved in his mind,
without hearing the remainder of Mr. Chapman's case or even his testimony.

The parties appeared on February 25, 1999 as scheduled. Mr. Chapman was
finally able to take the stand to testify regarding his financial position and the fact
that the temporary child support and alimony orders had forced him to live with
his parents and that he barely had enough money to eat each month or to purchase
gas for his car in order to commute to work.

Disposition of Trial Court:
On February 25, 1999 the trial court awarded sole custody of the parties' minor to
Mrs. Chapman, subject to Mr. Chapman's right to minimum visitation. The Court
further ordered Mr. Chapman to pay $ 779.00 in child support each month, $
500.00 in alimony each month, and to pay Mrs. Chapman's attorney's fees in the
amount of $ 14,550.00. Said Decree of Divorce became final on April 19, 1999.

8

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Brad and Desire Chapman were married on August 22, 1981 in Salt Lake City,
State of Utah. To their union were born three children, to wit: Corey Shane Chapman,
age 14; Khristopher Devin Chapman, age 11; and Dakohta Ravin Chapman, age 4. The
parties separated on or about July 1, 19971.
During the course of the marriage, Mrs. Chapman was employed as an accountant,
real estate agent, worked with computers and other jobs and is capable of earning in
excess of $40,000.00 per year.
Mr. Chapman worked as a voice coach in California, earning in excess of
$50,000.00 per year, until the parties returned to the State of Utah in 1987. Thereafter,
Mr. Chapman worked for Altice - Prescom Electronics, Inc. in Ogden, Utah. While
employed at Altice-Prescom, the trial court found that Mr. Chapman earned $34,610 in
1994, $34,322.16 in 1995, 34,489.37 in 1996, $43,321,345 in 1997, and $31,936.96 in
1998.
The parties began having marital discord when they sold their home to Mr.
Chapman's parents in order to withdraw the equity in the home. Said equity was to be
used to add on an apartment on the back of the house, in which Mr. Chapman's parents
would then reside. The parties received approximately $38,000 in equity with which to
build this add-on apartment.

1

February 25, 1999 Transcript at page 140, line 20
9

In the summer of 1997, before the construction was completed, Mr. Chapman
learned that the money was gone and $12,000 was unaccounted for. Confronting his
wife, Mr. Chapman demanded to know where the money had gone. Mrs. Chapman had
no explanation, other than it had been spent on the necessities of raising three children
and day to day living expenses.
After this confrontation, the parties' animosity towards one another grew to the
point that Mr. Chapman moved into the basement, sealed the door separating the upstairs
from the basement and lived alone. This arrangement allowed Mr. Chapman to see and
enjoy his children until he moved out to live with his parent during the divorce litigation.
Mrs. Chapman filed for divorce on or about December 12, 1997 and served Mr.
Chapman with a summons and complaint on or about January 28, 1998. Subsequently,
Mrs. Chapman amended her complaint to join Mr. Chapman's parents, in order to protect
her interest in the house and not be evicted by the older Chapman.
The parties appeared before the First Judicial District Court, the Honorable Judge
Clint S. Judkins presiding, on December 17, 1997. At that time the Court awarded
custody of the parties' children to Mrs. Chapman and ordered Mr. Chapman to pay child
support in the amount of $973.00 per month, plus forty percent (40%) of the household
utilities while living in the residence's basement, and the house mortgage in the amount
of $975.00. In addition, the Court ordered Mr. Chapman to pay temporary alimony in the
amount of $200.00 per month.
The parties appeared again, for Mrs. Chapman's Order to Show Cause on
10

February 24, 1998. The parties appeared again on September 15, 1998 on motions from
both parties. They appeared on October 27, 1998, again on Mrs. Chapman's motion, and
again on December 12, 1998. They were scheduled for trial on January 12, 1999.
However, due to Mrs. Chapman's failure to respond to Mr. Chapman's discovery
requests, the trial was continued until February 12, 1999.
During the trial of this matter on February 12, 1999, Mrs. Chapman was able to
present her case, including testimony for the custody evaluator and the children's
therapist. However, due to the length of Mrs. Chapman's case, Mr. Chapman was not
able to take the stand and the trial was continued until February 25, 1999. At the close of
the trial on February 12, 1999, Judge Judkins asked the parties' counsel to meet with him
in chambers. During this informal conference, Judge Judkins expressed his interest in a
monetary issue Mr. Chapman was pursuing, that of the missing $12,000fromthe equity
in the parties' house. However, Judge Judkins stated that as far as custody of the
Chapman's children, he had made up his mind and wondered if the parties could forgo a
second day and the expense incurred therefrom. Mr. Chapman had not yet testified so his
counsel argued that additional time was necessary to complete his case.
The parties appeared as scheduled on February 25, 1999 and Mr. Chapman
finished presenting his case. Subsequently, the Court made its final ruling in this matter.
Initially, the court stated that "this was not a difficult case. The case was dragged on

11

because of the emotion between the parties."2 The Court awarded custody of the
Chapman children to Mrs. Chapman and ordered Mr. Chapman to pay monthly child
support in the amount of $779. 00. Despite the evidence of Mr. Chapman's inability to
pay alimony or attorney's fees, the court ordered Mr. Chapman to pay alimony in the
amount of $500.00 per month and summarily ordered Mr. Chapman to pay Mrs.
Chapman's attorney's fees in the amount of $ 14,550.00.3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court is required to consider the following factors before awarding
alimony; (i) thefinancialcondition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's
earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to
provide support; and (iv) the length of the marriage. Mr. Chapman argues that the
evidence produced at trial, as well as presented at many hearing prior to trial, does not
support afindingthat he has the ability to provide alimony support at the level ordered by
the trial court.
Moreover, Mr. Chapman argues that the trial court ordered him to pay Mrs.
Chapman's attorney's fees, in the amount of $14,550.00 as a sanction or punishment for
his alleged misconduct during the pendency of this matter and forcing the parties to come
back a second day tofinishthe trial of this matter. In addition, the trial court failed to

2

February 25, 1999 Transcript at page 137, lines 5 and 6

3

February 25, 1999 Transcript at page 142, lines 13 through 16
12

find on the record that Mrs. Chapman demonstrated a need for assistance in paying her
attorney's fees. Moreover, the trial court failed to find on the record or in its findings
that Mr. Chapman had the ability to pay said attorney's fees and, furthermore, the fees
are excessive and unreasonable for a case of this kind. The court stated on the record and
in its findings that this was a simple custody matter.
ARGUMENTS
I
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
ALIMONY TO THE APPELLEE WITHOUT FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANT HAD THE ABILITY TO PAY ALIMONY AS ORDERED?
The May 1 1995 amendment to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 statutorily codified
under subsection (7) the well established standard for setting alimony. The statute now
requires courts to consider four factors - rather then the three traditionally repeated
throughout the long line of alimony cases. The courts are to consider (i) the financial
condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability
to produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and (iv) the
length of the marriage. When the trial court fails to make findings on these four factors,
or if the evidence does not support such a finding, and such evidence on the record is
clear, uncontroverted, and incapable of supporting such a finding in favor of the alimony
judgment, that judgment should be set aside.
Moreover, an alimony award should to the extent possible, "equalize the parties'
respective post divorce living standards and maintain them at a level as close as possible
13

to that standard of living enjoyed during the marriage." Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d
1331. 1333 (Utah App. 1988).
In addressing Mrs. Chapman's earning capacity, the trial court found that she had
a negative income for 1995 and 19964. However, the parties were still married and
living together during those years. Indeed all incomefromboth parties was deposited
into the parties joint checking account. The relevance of this finding escapes Mr.
Chapman and should not have been considered in awarding alimony. The trial court also
found that Mrs. Chapman earned $12,494 in 1997 and $5,798.04 in 1998, but imputed
income at the Federal minimum wage level, $893.00 per month, which is less than she
earned in 19975. Mr. Chapman argues that the court erred in imputing a lower income
than Mrs. Chapman earned.
The trial court found that this was a long term marriage, of 17.5 years. The court
also found that, after averaging Mr. Chapman's income, he earned $2,978 per month. As
set forth above, the trial court imputed a monthly income of $893 per month to Mrs.
Chapman. In regards to Mrs. Chapman's financial condition and needs, the court did not
find that Mrs. Chapman required $3,257.11 to enjoy the standard of living which she
enjoyed during the marriage6. However, Mrs. Chapman's counsel inserted said language

Paragraph 8 of the parties' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Paragraph 8 of the parties' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
February 25, 1999 Transcript at page 138, lines 2 and 3.
February 25, 1999 Transcript at pages 137 through 142.
14

into the Findings of Fact, which were objected to by Mr. Chapman's counsel7. Mrs.
Chapman's allegedfinancialneed exceeds her income, as well as Mr. Chapman's income
and Mrs. Chapman's imputed income combined.
"[T]he general purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from
becoming a public charge and to maintain to the extent possible the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage. Cox v. Cox. 877 P.2d 1262, 1267 (Utah App. 1994) (citing
Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991). The strict interpretation of
this language suggests that the primary purpose of alimony is to keep Mrs. Chapman
from becoming a public charge. Then, if possible, alimony should be set at a level to
maintain to the extent possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. The
trial court recognized this interpretation and, though Mrs. Chapman sought alimony in the
amount of $770 per month, awarded alimony in the amount of $500 per month.
Mr. Chapman argues that the trial court failed to address Mrs. Chapman's need,
her ability to provide support or whether Mr. Chapman could pay alimony in its ruling8.
Furthermore, the trial court did not find that Mrs. Chapman could not work full time to
provide for her financial need. Indeed, the court failed to find that Mrs. Chapman was
voluntarily underemployed when imputing income to her at a level lower than she earned
in 1997. The Utah Court of Appeals has ruled that "a [trial] court should not impute

Paragraph 16 of the parties' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
8

February 25, 1999 Transcript at pages 137 through 142.
15

income for child support or spousal support until it first determines, 'as a threshold
matter, that income should be imputed because the [spouse] is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed. Id. at 1267. Moreover, in assessing spousal support, trial courts rely on
historical income rather than income at the time of the divorce where a party "has
experienced a temporary decrease in income." Id,, at 1267. Therefore, Mr. Chapman
argues that Mrs. Chapman's income should have been set at $12,494 or more per year
rather than imputed at $893 per month.
Mr. Chapman further argues that the trial court's ruling was so inadequate on this
matter that it is impossible to determine the legal basis for the award. In light of the
court's woeful ruling, Mr. Chapman argues that the alimony award is excessive, that he
does not have the ability to pay as ordered, and that the court abused its discretion in
awarding alimony in the amount of $500 per month.
Mr., Chapman acknowledges that a trial court has considerable discretion in
adjusting the financial interests of the parties and that the court's "actions are entitled to a
presumption of validity." Cummings v. Cummings. 821, 472, 480 (Utah App. 1991);
Alfred v. Alfred. 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1990). However, the record must
support the trial court's findings before this Court can presume its validity. The trial
court erred in imputing a lower income to Mrs. Chapman. The record in this matter does
not support the alimony award and, therefore, the award is invalid.

n
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
16

ATTORNEY FEES TO THE APPELLEE WITHOUT FINDING THAT
THE APPELLANT HAD THE ABILITY TO PAY SAID ATTORNEY FEES?
While the trial court has the power to award attorney's fees in divorce
proceedings, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3 (1995), "the award must be
based on the evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the
other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. Bell v. BelL 810 P.2d
489, 493 (Utah App. 1991); Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah App. 1988).
Mr. Chapman acknowledges that the decision to make such an award and the amount
thereof rest primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. See. Kerr v. Kerr. 610
P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980). However, Mr. Chapman argues that the trial court failed to
consider or find that he had the ability to pay said fees or whether the fees were
reasonable. The record reflects no findings regarding any factors suggesting that an
attorney fee award of $14,550, in Brigham City, Utah, is reasonable.
The record of the court's ruling is clear and unambiguous. There are no findings
of Mrs. Chapman's need for payment of her attorney's fees. The court subsequently
failed to rule that Mr. Chapman had the ability to pay said fees9. Mrs. Chapman's
counsel inserted the following language to the Findings of Fact, which he wrote: Mr.
Chapman "has the ability to pay the attorney's fees for Mrs. Chapman and judgment is
entered against him in behalf of his wife in the amount of $14,550 as and for attorney

9

February 25, 1999 Transcript at pages 137 through 142
17

fees."10 The only explanation given for this award is the court's finding that Mrs.
Chapman incurred said fees11. Again Mrs. Chapman's counsel through additional
wording, not found by the court, stating that much of those expenses were incurred
because of the actions of Mr. Chapman in contesting the custody of the minor children.
The trial court did not rule that much of the expenses were incurred due to Mr.
Chapman's conduct. However, even the inventive writing of Mrs. Chapman's counsel
fails to go to the issue of Mr. Chapman's ability to pay said attorney fees. There simply
is no findings given by the trial court, or Mrs. Chapman's counsel, regarding Mr.
Chapman's ability to pay $14,550 in attorney's fees and, therefore, there is no adequate
explanation for the court's award.
Without a finding that Mr. Chapman had the ability to pay $14,550 for Mrs.
Chapman's attorney's fees and without an adequate explanation for the court's award, the
order for Mr. Chapman to pay these fees should be set aside.

in
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO THE APPELLEE WITHOUT
FINDING THAT THE FEES WERE REASONABLE?
While the award of attorney's fees in a divorce action is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, the exercise of that discretion is limited by case law. Utah

10

The last sentence of paragraph 22 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

11

February 25, 1999 Transcript at page 142, lines 13 and 14.

Law.

18

Code Annotated § 30-3-3 (1995) is designed to ensure that the poorer party in a divorce
litigation has the financial means to litigate the action. Attorney's fees were not meant to
serve as a sanction or punishment to one party or the other. However, in light of Judge
Judkins' comments in chambers, in addition to the chastising findings prepared by Mrs.
Chapman's counsel, regarding this matter, it is clear that this award of attorney's fees is
just that, a sanction against Mr. Chapman for exercising his legal right to challenge Mrs.
Chapman's conduct during the pendency of this matter, fight for custody of his children,
and for bringing the parties back to trial in order to complete his case. The judicial
directive regarding attorney's fees in divorce matters is clear. The sole consideration for
the awarding of attorney's fees is the financial resources of the parties and the
reasonableness of said fees. Admittedly, a obstreperous litigant should pay in some
manner for his conduct, but not pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-3.
Mr. Chapman acknowledges that the trial court may award a reasonable sum in
attorney's fees where one party shows a need for assistance. However, the trial court
failed to rule on Mrs. Chapman's need for assistance. Indeed, there is no mention of any
need in the court's ruling12. Once again, the trial court failed to consider the Mr.
Chapman's ability to pay said attorney's fees before making said award. And there was
no support for Mr. Chapman's ability to pay these fees in the trial court's findings.
The award made by the trial court in this matter is excessive in light of the facts of

12

February 25, 1999 Transcript at pages 137 through 142.
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this case and other Utah decisions which have generally awarded one-third the amount of
fees requested, based upon a showing that the wife's living expenses exceed her monthly
earnings. It is not enough for the trial court to simply make the summary finding that
"The court finds that the plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees in the amount of 14,550.
That they are reasonable under the circumstances and will award attorney's fees in that
amount."13
The trial court may order either party to pay sums to enable the other party "to
prosecute or defend the action." Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3 (1995). However an
award of attorney's fees will be overturned where the trial court abused its discretion.
Waltherv. Walther, 709 P.2d 387 (Utah 1985). Before an award may be made, the party
requesting assistance must show financial need. See Christensen v. Christensen. 667
P.2d 592, 596 (Utah 1983); Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 646 (Utah 1980). Mrs.
Chapman failed to request assistance and the court did not find that she required any
assistance for payment of her attorney's fees.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently rejected a request for attorney's fees
when the requesting party failed to show any necessity for assistance in making the
payments or an inability to pay. Adams v, Adams. 593 P.2d 147, 149 (Utah 1979);
Georgedes v. Georgedes. 627 P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 1987). The court has, however, upheld
awards of one-third of all attorney's fees requested by wife where her monthly expenses

February 25, 1999 Transcript at page 142, lines 13 through 16.
20

exceeded her monthly income. Huck v. Hack. 13A P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1986); Pusey v.
Pusey. 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986), and has awarded portions of amounts requested
where a significant portion of wife's obligation arose because of husband's conduct and
wife was without income other than alimony with which to pay her attorney. Yelderman
v. Yelderman. 669 P.2d 406, 410 (Utah 1983). However, in this case Mrs. Chapman
worked throughout the marriage and was working at the time of the trial14.
At the time of trial the court found that Mr. Chapman had a monthly income of
$2,978 and that his share of the child support would be $779, leaving him with "before
tax" income of $2,199 per month15. At the time of trial Mrs. Chapman was employed, as
she was throughout the marriage, though her imputed income was $893 per month. Mrs.
Chapman estimated that her living expenses were approximately $3,257. II16. Though the
record does not show that the court found that Mrs. Chapman's living expenses were
approximately $3,257.11, that finding did make its way into the Findings of fact prepared
by Mrs. Chapman's counsel17.
Like the wives in Adams and Georgedes. Mrs. Chapman failed to present evidence
directed at showing herfinancialneed for assistance in paying her attorney. She is
14

Volume I of February 12, 1999 Transcript line 17 of page 124 through line 5 of

page 129
15

Paragraph 16 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

16

Volume I of February 12, 1999 Transcript at pages 109 and 110, lines 24, 25 and

17

Paragraph 16 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

1
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presently employed earning substantial sums on a part time basis and she has family
financial support. Mrs. Chapman evidenced no extraordinary expenses as a result of the
children's health. Mr. Chapman was ordered to pay any past due mortgage/rent
payments, leaving Mrs. Chapman free of material obligations. Pursuant to statute, Mr.
Chapman was further ordered to pay one-half of the children's future medical expenses
not covered by insurance.
Mrs. Chapman presented evidence that her monthly expenses exceeded her
monthly income. However, in those cases where the Supreme Court has upheld the
award of attorney's fees in favor of the wife based upon the fact that her monthly income
did not cover monthly expenses, the court has consistently awarded only one-third of the
amount requested. Nor have any prior awards, based upon actions by the husbands
resulted in an order requiring the husbands to pay the full amount of legal fees as was
ordered in this case.
Here the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the entire sum of attorney's
fees incurred by Mrs. Chapman. Mrs. Chapman failed to show a need for assistance in
paying her legal fees and Mr. Chapman is without resources to assist her in payment of
these legal expenses. Furthermore, the amount awarded is triple the amount permitted in
analogous cases.
While an award of attorney's fees in divorce cases rests within the discretion of
the trial court, such an award must be based on the "reasonableness of the requested fees,
as well as thefinancialneed of the receiving spouse and the ability of the other spouse to
22

pay." Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Utah 1994) (citing Rasband v. Rasband. 752
P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah App. Ct. 1988).
Reasonable attorney's fees are not measured by what an attorney actually
bills, nor is the number of hours spent on the case determinative in computing
fees. In determining the reasonableness of attorney fees ... [a] court may
consider, among other factors, the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of
the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours
spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services,
the amount involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and
experience of the attorney's involved.
Cabrera v. CottrelL 694 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985)
There are many divorce actions in which both parents seek custody of their
children and one parent or the other disputes the custody evaluator's recommendations.
This case was no different. Indeed, the trial court specifically found that "this was not a
difficult custody case..."18 A significant fact in this case is that it took place in Box
Elder County, in Brigham City. It is unreasonable to attempt to charge $14,550.00 for a
simple divorce and custody case in this rural town. Granted Mrs. Chapman was awarded
custody of the minor children, however, as ordered in the best interests of the children not
as a win for Mrs. Chapman. Nor was Mrs. Chapman awarded the alimony she sought.
Accordingly, the trial court's award of $14,550 in attorney's fees reflects an abuse
of discretion and said order should be set aside, or at the very least remanded to better
reflect reasonable attorney's fees which Mr. Chapman may have the ability to pay.

18

February 25, 1999 Transcript at page 137, line 5 and Paragraph 22 of the
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
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CONCLUSION
The trial court made several significant errors in its ruling of this case. The court
erred in imputing an income to Mrs. Chapman which was lower than her historical
earnings. The court erred in failing to address Mr. Chapman's ability to pay alimony in
the amount of $500.00 per month. The court erred in failing to find that Mrs. Chapman
required assistance in paying her attorney's fees. The court erred in failing to find that
Mr. Chapman had the ability to pay Mrs. Chapman's attorney's fees in the amount of
$14,550. The court erred in summarily finding that these exorbitant attorney's fees were
reasonable, in light of the court'sfindingthat this was not a difficult custody case.
Moreover, the court erred in ordering Mr. Chapman to pay $14,550 in attorney's fees as a
sanction or punishment against him.
Therefore, these matter should be remanded for additional litigation to determine
whether Mr. Chapman has the ability to pay alimony in the amount of $500 per month.
In addition, due to the trial court's lack of findings or any evidence to support the
attorney's fees award, said award should be set aside because (1) Mr. Chapman does not
have the ability to pay said fees in the amount of $14,550; (2) the amount of attorney's
fees are unreasonable; and (3) they were ordered as a sanction or punishment against Mr.
Chapman.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s l ^ r day of may, 2000.
LEN R. ELDRIDGE, P.C.
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